Increasing consumers' environmental awareness has drawn more firms' attention to low-carbon production. CO 2 emission management control is a critical factor in the process of low-carbon production in a supply chain. Such kind of inter-organizational control includes two different strategies: the emission control and emission reduction. Those two strategies have different influences on the performance of the supply chain. This paper uses the differential method to study the Stackelberg game between a manufacturer and a supplier in four situations: (1) the non-cooperative situation where no coordination is considered; (2) the weak incentive situation where the emission control incentive is considered; (3) the strong incentive situation where both the emission control incentive and the emission reduction incentive are considered; (4) the cooperative situation where the cooperation is considered. Optimal inter-organizational control of the emission control efforts, emission reduction efforts and cost subsidy are solved and discussed. The results show that although the emission control cost lower, its positive effect on the supply chain performance is still limited. Both the supplier and the manufacturer have the Pareto improvements from the non-cooperative situation to the cooperative situation in sequence. Finally, the simulations and sensitivity analyses are conducted to support the models. Our study provides theoretical insights to the optimal control of low-carbon production in an inter-organizational setting.
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past 22 years since the signing of the Kyoto Protocol, the emissions of CO 2 have increased by half and grown rapidly. Global warming becomes more and more serious. Faced with these severe environmental issues, all sectors of society make concerted efforts to manage CO 2 emissions. The common methods include the administration approach and the market approach. As the core force, governments play a crucial part in the management of CO 2 emissions [1] . It was indicated in the Paris Climate Agreement that the contracting governments established the arrangement of reducing more CO 2 emissions before 2050. Recently, in December 2018, representatives came to Katowice, Poland to discuss the details of the Paris Climate Agreement. To regulate the enterprises, the control levels of CO 2 emissions were carried out by The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Ton Do . many countries. The government sets the standard emission level and punishes the enterprises whose emissions are higher than the standard. This type of regulation is very common all around the world especially in the emerging economies such as China and India [2] . It is a kind of administrative measure that exerts pushing power to motivate enterprises to control their emissions [3] . On the other hand, consumers have become more concerned about environmental issues [4] . Empirical data show that about 30% of consumers have strong environmental awareness [5] . Those green consumers are sensitive to carbon content. They are likely to choose products with lower carbon emissions. Consumers' increasing environmental awareness stimulates the enterprises to promote the low-carbon production actively. It is a kind of market measure that exerts pulling force for the enterprises to further manage their emissions [6] .
Both of the emission control and the emission reduction have influences on the enterprises' CO 2 emissions. Many prior researches studied the different effect of those two methods [7] - [9] . However, they neglect the subjective initiative of the enterprises. According to the contingency theory, the specific strategy of the enterprise depends on its goal. Although faced with two macroscopic emission management methods, the strategy choice of the enterprise may not the same. Specifically, from the perspective of enterprises, the cost-performance ratio of the two corresponding strategies (emission control and emission reduction) is different. Controlling emissions refers to the strategy that the enterprise only keeps the CO 2 emissions lower than the governmental standard so that the penalty can be avoided [10] . Reducing emissions refers to the strategy that the enterprise further reduces the CO 2 emissions to meet the green preference of consumers [11] . With a lower cost, emission control attracts more attention than the emission reduction in the emerging economies. However, its effect on managing the CO 2 emissions is limited for the reason that it only aims to control the CO 2 emissions under the governmental standard. The purpose of the enterprise to take the emission control strategy is to avoid the penalty from the government. Hence it lacks the motivation from the market to further reduce the emissions [10] . Although the positive effect of the emission control is not so good as the emission reduction, it still influences the unfavorable climate change significantly [12] . It's better than nothing.
According to the report of IPCC, there are 45% of CO 2 emissions are discharged in the process of manufacturing. It seems that the manufacturer accounts for the most in this process. However, modern competition is not the competition between the single enterprises, but the competition between the supply chains [13] . Faced with both the power of the demand market and governmental regulation, manufacturers have the motivation to control and reduce CO 2 emissions through incentive and innovation. It also makes requests on their upstream and downstream enterprises. Thus, the coordination mechanism between the upstream and downstream enterprises becomes a critical part of the inter-organizational management of CO 2 emissions [14] .
On the basis of the background analyzed above, our paper focuses on the different influences of the emission control strategy and the emission reduction strategy on the supply chain performance. To capture the characteristics of this dynamic process, the differential Stackelberg game method is used in our models. The following four research questions are studied: (1) What are the influences of the emission control strategy and the emission reduction strategy on the supply chain performance? Are there any differences between them? (2) How does the inter-organizational control work in a supply chain setting? What type of coordination mechanism are suitable for the manufacturer to motivate the supplier? (3) What are the optimal strategies of the manufacturer and the supplier considering the dynamic and far-sighted factors? To answer these research questions, this paper uses the differential method to study the Stackelberg game between a manufacturer and a supplier in four situations: (1) the non-cooperative situation where no coordination is considered; (2) the weak incentive situation where the emission control incentive is considered; (3) the strong incentive situation where both the emission control incentive and the emission reduction incentive are considered; (4) the cooperative situation where the cooperation is considered.
This paper contributes to the relevant studies in the following three aspects. (1) It differentiates the emission control strategy and the emission reduction strategy in an inter-organizational setting (i.e., the supply chain). Controlling and reducing CO 2 emissions are two different strategies for firms. Those firms need to make choice according to their different goals and cost-performance ratio. However, many previous studies neglected the emission control strategy. (2) It considers the influence of time and studies the optimal control problem in a dynamic view. The manufacturer and the supplier in our models are far-sighted. They think about the further impact of their current decisions. It is much closer to reality. (3) It focuses on the inter-organizational control and combines the microscopic elements with the macroscopic elements. The specific coordination mechanism proposed in our paper can be helpful for the manufacturer to carry out the inter-organizational incentives in a holistic view. This paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 reviews the previous studies. Section 3 presents the assumptions and notations. Then, four differential game situations (including the non-cooperative situation, the weak incentive situation, the strong incentive situation, and the cooperative situation) are analyzed in Section 4 respectively. Relevant discussions are presented in Section 5 and simulations and sensitivity analyses are conducted in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
In the research field of environmental economics, many prior studies paid attention to the environmental issues in the aspect of governmental policies, detailed regulations and corresponding incentives [15] . The power of operation and market is accounting for an increasingly critical part in the environmental issues and attracts the attention of scholars these days. In the aspect of operational view, reference [12] shows that the production of green products not only needs the producer's effort but also needs the joint efforts of companies in the whole supply chain. Thus, it would be much more beneficial for the manufacturer to appropriately motivate for his/her upstream and downstream companies. It is confirmed in [16] that the carbon emissions costs should be considered in the formation stage of the supply chain. During this process, an appropriate coordination mechanism is important to motivate the partner firms. Moreover, the specific coordination mechanism in a green supply chain has been discussed in [17] . They pointed that the cooperative alliance with all partner firms is the best situation. Taking the firm's supply chain status (leader and follower) into consideration, reference [18] uses the Stackelberg game to analyze the impact of carbon-reducing coordination in a low-carbon supply chain. It is indicated in [19] that with the background of the difficult upgrading of a comprehensive energy system, it is impractical to adapt the discontinuity approach to reduce emissions suddenly; instead, the continuity approach is much more suitable to control and reduce the emissions. Noticing the effect of the ''carbon lock-in'' phenomenon, reference [20] shows that companies are more inclined to use the existing carbon-intensive technological systems because of the cost and habituation. So, they only control carbon emissions instead of reducing them considering the higher reducing cost. In [10] , the process of supply chain emission management has been analyzed. It is shown that this process is a step-by-step procedure from controlling to reducing.
As for the market impetus, the increasing low-carbon preference of consumers plays an important role in motivating companies to produce environment-friendly products. It can be seen as a significant pulling power of the market. Reference [21] empirically finds that consumers are likely to spend more money on environment-friendly products with their growing attention to environment protection. In [22] , the effect of a carbon labeling program conducted in America from 2001 to 2010 has been traced. It is found that the carbon emissions have been reduced by 150 million metric ton during these ten years. It is also indicated that the significant emission reduction effect owes a great deal to the consumers' environmental awareness. In the aspect of consumers, reference [23] uses the questionnaire survey to empirically study the relationship between consumers' preference and energy source. It shows that consumers are much more willing to purchase low-carbon energy. Moreover, reference [24] finds that under the condition that the initial carbon emissions of the company are not too high, both of the pulling power from environment-conscious consumers and the pushing power from governmental policies can lead to lower carbon emissions of the company. In [25] , the influences of competition level and consumers' environmental awareness of the sustainable supply chains have been considered. The results show that the level of consumers' environmental awareness has positive impacts on supply chain performance with the specific coordination mechanism. Reference [26] also highlights the importance of consumers' environmental consciousness. It can motivate manufacturers to make more efforts on low-carbon innovation and production. It further drives the sustainable development of the supply chain. Facing with the governmental carbon labeling program and consumers' environmental awareness, companies also take actions to meet the expectation. An empirical study of [12] showed that disclosing carbon information of products (such as carbon emissions, energy efficiency, carbon footprints, etc.) becomes an effective competition method for companies to expand the market shares.
Prior literature of game theory studied supply chain in the following aspects: contract design, coordination mechanism, operation performance, cost allocation and so on [27] - [29] . For example, considering the information asymmetry, the Nash bargaining game has been used in [29] to study the CO 2 emission strategy of a two-echelon supply chain. Reference [30] focuses on the supply chain in the fashion industry. The optimal emission strategies and the corresponding profits of member companies have been studied by oligopoly games. In view of bounded rationality, the coopetition activities in a two-echelon supply chain have been analyzed in [31] through the evolutionary game. It is indicated that both the manufacturer and the retailer need to find a tradeoff between carbon emissions and profits. On the other hand, reference [32] introduces the time as an important influential factor in the model. The importance of managing carbon emissions in the long run has been highlighted. As time plays a necessary role, companies need to be far-sighted in this process. Moreover, an appropriate coordination mechanism can lead to decreasing carbon emissions as time going on. Based on this idea, reference [18] uses the differential game method to study the dynamic strategies of carbon emissions. It is proposed that the supply chain's overall profit can be improved by the appropriate carbon emission coordination. These prior studies have paid main attention to the influence of emission reduction on the profit of the supply chain. However, they did not catch the difference between the emission control and emission reduction. Also, they neglected the different influential paths of those two activities on supply chain performance.
III. ASSUMPTIONS AND NOTATIONS
The research object of our paper is a two-level green supply chain which is composed of one supplier and one manufacturer. In this Stackelberg game, the manufacturer acts as the leader because he masters the core technology. And the supplier is the follower. Moreover, with the increasing environmental awareness, consumers' low-carbon preference significantly influences the market demand. The government also requires companies to control carbon emission. Therefore, the emission control is required by the government as a basic entry condition. The further emission reduction asked by consumers is an internal impetus for companies to manufacture the products with lower carbon emissions. Faced with the pressure from both governments and consumers, the manufacturer is likely to control and further reduce the emissions of products. This plan not only needs the manufacturer to invest in low-carbon production equipment and technology but also needs the supplier to supply green materials. To motivate the supplier to actively work on both of the emission control and reduction, the manufacturer considers giving some cost subsidies to the supplier. Thus, the main problem in this study is the inter-organizational control of low-carbon production in a supply chain. Other influential factors such as retail price, inventory cost, and stochastic demand are not included in this study. The mechanism of inter-organizational control of low-carbon production in the supply chain is described in Figure 1 .
The notations and the relevant definitions in this study are shown in Table 1 as follows. According to the practice and the prior studies, we consider a quadratic cost function. Thus, at time t, the cost of effort on emission control and reduction of manufacturer and supplier can be given as:
In practice, the emission reduction is a dynamic process. It changes with time and is time-varied. Considering the phenomenon of ''carbon lock-in'', the aim of making efforts on emission control is to maintain the stability of emissions and to avoid the unexpected excessive emissions at a lower cost. When the firm devotes no effort on emission reduction, it tends to decay with time. It is because that the relevant technology and equipment will depreciate as time goes by.
According to the analyses above, the emission reduction process can be given as:
(2)
With the increasing environmental awareness, consumers are much more likely to purchase products with lower carbon emissions. According to the model of [21] , a linear market demand function is assumed in our paper. Both of the emission control and the emission reduction are linearly correlated with the maker demand [33] . Thus, the lower carbon level the product has, the more popular it will be. In this case, the market demand can be expressed as:
IV. DIFFERENTIAL GAME EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSES
The emission level of the product needs to be managed in the long run. It is because that the effect of emission management (including control and reduction) is inter-temporal and timeconsuming. Taking this factor into consideration, it would be better to introduce time into this inter-organizational control problem. Hence in this study, the differential game method is adopted. Moreover, to better clarify the different activities associated with emission management, we divide them into two types: emission control and emission reduction. At the same time, different game situations are also introduced in our paper. We compare the optimal strategies in the Nash non-cooperative game situation, weak incentive Stackelberg game situation, strong incentive Stackelberg game situation and cooperative game situation respectively.
A. NASH NON-COOPERATIVE GAME SITUATION (MARKED AS N MODEL)
In this situation, the manufacturer and the supplier will independently decide their own efforts on emission control and emission reduction at the same time in the purpose of maximizing their own profits. Hence, the objective function of the supplier and the manufacturer can be expressed as:
Then the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman Equations (hereinafter referred as HJB equation) of the supplier and the manufacturer are denoted as V S , V M for all x ≥ 0. They are given as:
Differentiate HJB equations with respect to A S , A M , B S , B M respectively. The optimal efforts on the emission control VOLUME 7, 2019 and the emission reduction are given as:
Substitute those optimal strategies into the HJB equations. Then we can obtain:
From equations above, we can know that the HJB equations can be expressed as functions about x. To work out x, we assume the general form of
Then we can get:
Thus, the equilibrium profit belonging to the supplier and the manufacturer can be given as:
Differentiate the equations above with respect to x and substitute them into the optimal effort strategies. Then the equilibrium strategies can be written as:
Substitute all the optimal strategies into the dynamic function of emission reductionẋ(t) = αB S (t) + βB M (t) − γ x(t), the solution in this situation can be:
where ω = α 2 δU S γ µ 2 (ρ+γ ) + β 2 δU M γ µ 4 (ρ+γ ) .
B. WEAK INCENTIVE STACKELBERG GAME SITUATION (MARKED AS W MODEL)
In this situation, a status gap between supplier and manufacturer are considered. The manufacturer acts as the leader due to the key technology she masters. The supplier is the follower in this game. Both of them coordinate with each other to manage the emissions for a long time. Taking the higher cost of emission reduction into consideration, the manufacturer pays much attention to the control stability of emissions and only motivate to the effort on emission control of the supplier, which means the weak incentive here. The game sequence is: the manufacturer firstly decides her efforts on the emission control and the emission reduction A M , B M , and the costsharing proportion of supplier's emission control effort h(t).
After observing the actions of the manufacturer, the supplier makes decisions on her own efforts on emission control and emission reduction A S , B S . Hence, the objective function of the supplier and the manufacturer can be expressed as:
According to the same solving process, which is omitted here, the optimal profit of supplier, manufacturer, and the supply chain can be expressed as:
Differentiate the equations above with respect to x and substitute them into the optimal efforts and cost-sharing strategies. Then the equilibrium strategies can be written as:
C. STRONG INCENTIVE STACKELBERG GAME SITUATION (MARKED AS I MODEL)
In this situation, a status gap between supplier and manufacturer are still considered. The manufacturer acts as the leader due to the key technology she masters. The supplier is the follower in this game. Considering the consumers' particular preference for low-carbon products, the manufacturer has the tendency to give incentives to the supplier on both of the emission control and emission reduction activities. It means the strong incentive in this case. The game sequence is: the manufacturer firstly decides her efforts on the emission control and the emission reduction A M , B M , and the cost-sharing proportions of supplier's emission control and reduction effort h(t), k(t). After observing the actions of the manufacturer, the supplier makes decisions on her own efforts on emission control and emission reduction A S , B S . Hence, the objective function of the supplier and the manufacturer can be expressed as:
We differentiate the equations above with respect to x and substitute them into the optimal effort function and cost subsidy on both of the efforts on emission control and emission reduction. Then the equilibrium strategies can be written as: Then the equilibrium strategies can be given as:
where ω =
D. COOPERATIVE GAME SITUATION (MARKED AS C MODEL)
In this situation, we assume that two partner firms in this supply chain are bonded together as a whole. They share the joint goal that maximizing the overall supply chain profit. It is an ideal situation and the benchmark of our study. Hence, the objective function of the supply chain can be expressed as:
According to the same solving process, which is omitted here, the optimal profit of supply chain can be expressed as:
where the overall profit of the supply chain can be allocated to the manufacturer and the supplier respectively based on the proportion of their marginal profit. Then we differentiate the equations above with respect to x and substitute them into the optimal effort function. The optimality can be written as:
where
V. DISCUSSIONS
According to the analyses of the four games in Section 4, four theorems are developed in the aspect of optimal effort, profit, and emission reduction as follows. Noting that U M U S +U M means the part of profit belonging to the manufacturer, hence the manufacturer's cost subsidies should be less than her own profit. According to the analyses of subsidy conditions in four games, supplier's effort on emission control remains the same in both of the situations of weak and strong incentive games. However, the effort on emission reduction of the supplier in the strong incentive situation is higher than that in the weak incentive situation considering the corresponding inventive by the manufacturer. Supplier's efforts on both emission control and emission reduction are lowest in the Nash non-cooperative game situation and highest in the cooperative game situation. As the models in Section 4 show, the manufacturer only makes an incentive on the effort of emission control of supplier, for the reason that the cost of incentive on emission reduction effort will be much higher and the phenomenon of ''carbon lock-in'' can lead to the inertia of supply chain. While the consumers' low-carbon preference is closely related to market demand of the products, the manufacturer also has the motivation to further reduce emissions of the whole supply chain to be certified the low-carbon label. So, in situation 3, the manufacturer decides to motivate the supplier on the effort of emission reduction, which leads to the increased effort on emission reduction of the supplier. Based on the Differential game equilibrium analyses in Section 4, the manufacturer's effort can be divided into two groups: the level in the non-cooperative game situation and the level in the cooperative game situation. In the situation of Nash non-cooperative game, weak Stackelberg game and strong Stackelberg game, manufacturer's efforts are all the same. However, the efforts (both on emission control and emission reduction) in the cooperative situation is much larger than those in the non-cooperative situation. It means that the manufacturer's decision about efforts does not depend on the type of non-cooperative situations when there are no other incentive factors. And the effort in the cooperative situation can be a benchmark considering the complementarity between the two partner firms in the supply chain. As the leader in this game, the manufacturer is faced with more pressure from the green consumers; on the other hand, the manufacturer decides her effort on two kinds of emission management activities and the cost subsidies to balance the profit before the actions of supplier. Therefore, the efforts are the same in all non-cooperative situations, no matter what the effort type it is. In the cooperative situation, both manufacturer and supplier make decisions from the perspective of the supply chain, so the centralized decision is put forward, both of the efforts on emission control and emission reduction can reach the maximization.
Theorem 3: Let 2U M > U S , the relationship of the optimal profits of the supplier, manufacturer, and supply chain meets
we can know that the condition 2U M > U S should be met. In view of all the optimal profits, it is a kind of Pareto improvement from the Nash non-cooperative game to weak Stackelberg game, and then to the strong Stackelberg game, finally to the cooperative game. Here the condition 2U M > U S has significant practical meanings. It means that as an important factor in the inter-organization, the profit proportion of manufacturer needs to be higher than 1/3. While if this proportion is lower than 1/3, the manufacturer will not be motivated to improve the coordination mechanism of emission control and emission reduction in the inter-organizational settings. In practice, this situation occurs when the supplier is strong enough and good at bargaining.
Theorem 4: Let 2U M > U S , the emission reduction holds that
According to the equation
, ω is the critical factor to decide the variation of emission reduction. Because ω N = ω W < ω I < ω C , we get the relationship between four kinds of emission reduction in Theorem 4. Considering that the manufacturer will not make the cost subsidy incentive on the effort of emission reduction to supplier in the weak incentive Stackelberg game situation, the emission reduction in this situation remains equal to that in the Nash non-cooperative game situation. Then with the increasing intensity of motivation on the effort of emission reduction of the supplier, the emissions of the whole supply chain decrease significantly. Therefore, it is a kind of Pareto improvement from the non-cooperative situation to the cooperative situation for the whole supply chain. Compared with non-cooperative emission reduction, the cooperative mode leads the manufacturer and the supplier to work harder and to further enhance the overall profit. It means that when all the partner firms in the supply chain focus on one common goal, the overall profit of the supply chain will be maximized. They also need to take important factors including environment, society, and economy into consideration.
VI. SIMULATIONS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSES
In this section, the simulations and sensitivity analyses will be conducted to further clarify the difference and practical meanings of four games. It helps us to better understand the optimal strategies in the long run. We focus on the optimal profit and emission reduction strategy in this section. To further narrow the gap between the theory and the practice, we use the practical data to conduct simulations and sensitivity analyses. The relevant data were adopted from a large manufacturer who produces the steel cables. Here we call it F Group. F Group was certified as the model business group of lowcarbon production. Thus, it is a typical example to match our settings. According to the survey in F Group, their marginal profit can be set as U S = 3, U M = 4. The initial market demand follows D 0 = 10. Other parameters can be given as α = 0.4, β = 0.3, γ = 0.2, x 0 = 0, ρ = 0.1, ε = 0.2, η = 0.3, δ = 0.6, µ 1 = 6, µ 2 = 9, µ 3 = 8, µ 4 = 10,.
A. SIMULATIONS
Four groups of simulations about the optimal strategies are conducted in this section. The results are given in Figure 2 to 5 in sequence. In these figures, line S1 represents the optimal strategies in the Nash non-cooperative situation. Line S2 represents the optimal strategies in the weak incentive Stackelberg situation. Line S3 represents the optimal solutions in the strong incentive Stackelberg situation. Finally, line S4 represents the optimal solutions in the cooperative situation.
It is indicated in Figure 2 that in the cooperative situation, supplier's optimal profit is the highest considering both of the intercept and the slope. The optimal profit increases rapidly from time 0 to 10. And then it becomes stable gradually. The optimal profit in strong incentive Stackelberg game situation ranks the second due to a smaller intercept and increasing rate. However, the optimal profit in the situation of weak incentive Stackelberg game and Nash non-cooperative game are similar. The optimal profit in the weak inventive situation is slightly higher. The relationship between the four situations of the manufacturer can be approximately the same as the supplier, which is shown in Figure 3 . Pay attention to that the optimal profit of manufacturer in four situations are higher than the relative optimal profit of supplier, for the reason that we let the marginal profit of manufacturer be higher than that of supplier according to the survey in F Group. The optimal profits shown in Figure 4 also follows the law that cooperation ranks the highest, strong incentive situation ranks the second, and then is the weak incentive situation, non-cooperation ranks the lowest among the four situations. The line of emission reduction of the supply chain in Figure 5 can be divided into 3 parts considering that the lines in the situation of Nash non-cooperative game and weak incentive Stackelberg game are overlapped. This is mainly because we assume that in weak incentive Stackelberg game, taking the higher cost of emission reduction into consideration, the manufacturer only is willing to motivate on the supplier's effort of emission control. Therefore, there is no significant difference in the lines of emission reduction in the non-cooperative game situation and the weak incentive game situation.
B. SENSITIVITY ANALYSES
Due to the limitation of space and the significance of the different parameters, we analyze the sensitivity of several important parameters in the cooperative game situation. We include the manufacturer's emission control coefficient η in the demand function and the corresponding cost parameter µ 3 . We also analyze the manufacturer's effort coefficient β in the differential function of emission reduction and the corresponding cost parameter µ 4 . Sensitivity analyses of other parameters is similar to these four situations.
Firstly, the influence of manufacturer's emission control effort on the optimal overall profit is considered. It is indicated in Figure 6 that the optimal profit increases with the FIGURE 6. The impact of η on the profit of the supply chain. increment of the manufacturer's effort coefficient on emission control, which is denoted as η. The profit remains stable since time 25 in the four assumptions. On the other hand, the cost of effort on emission control coefficient µ 3 has a negative relationship with optimal profit according to Figure 7 . Then, the effort on emission reduction and the relative cost of the manufacturer, which are denoted as β, µ 4 , are also conducted the sensitivity analyses. In Figure 8 , with the increasing effort on emission reduction of the manufacturer, the optimal profit of supply chain raises significantly. The relative cost parameter µ 4 has a negative relationship with the profit, which is shown in Figure 9 and the same as the situation in Figure 7 . Overall, from the four figures, we find that manufacturer's effort on emission reduction has a more crucial influence on the optimal profit than the effort on emission control. It is because that against the backdrop of consumers' increasing preference to the low-carbon productions and the governmental ''carbon labeling'' program, the market demand is much more closely connected to the production emission reduction than emission control. In accordance with this reality, the manufacturer's effort on emission reduction has a more significant influence on the profit, as shown in Figure 8 , which is expressed as a sharper variation between the same increments than that in Figure 6 . The same reason can be used to explain the cost parameters of the effort on emission control and reduction, as we compare the lines in Figure 7 and Figure 9 , and find that the lines in Figure 7 are more compact.
VII. CONCLUSION
Considering the difference between the emission control and the emission reduction, this paper studies the inter-organizational control of low-carbon production in the supply chain in four differential game situations. It can be concluded that in the cooperative game situation, both of the two partner firms reach maximum profit and lowest emission. In the Nash non-cooperative game situation, both of the two partner firms gain the lowest optimal profit. However, if the manufacturer only motivates the emission control activity, the profits of two partner firms cannot be increased a lot. The strong incentives from the manufacturer to the supplier on both emission control and emission reduction have a significant promoting effect on the profit. Overall, under the specific condition (2U M > U S ), both the supplier and the manufacturer have the Pareto improvements from the non-cooperative situation to the cooperative situation in sequence.
Since the equilibrium strategies and the optimal profit are significantly related, it would be better for the partner firms in the supply chain to cooperate and coordinate toward a common goal. And this study provides theoretical support for companies to design incentive mechanisms. In the aspect of macroscopic view, this paper explores the evolution of management control in the inter-organizational setting: the traditional pattern emphasizing the internal management → the pattern emphasizing the emission control → the pattern emphasizing both of the emission control and reduction → the pattern emphasizing the cooperation of supply chain. It provides meaningful guidance for companies to conduct inter-organizational control of low-carbon production and helps them to manage emissions in the long run. Further researches may concentrate on the profit allocation, multi-lateral coordination, and other issues of emission control and reduction in practice. SHUAI HE received the bachelor's degree in financial management and the master's degree in accounting from the Xinjiang University of Finance and Economics, China, in 2012 and 2015, respectively. She is currently pursuing the Ph.D. degree in management science and engineering with Southeast University, China. She is currently a Lecturer with the School of Economic and Trade, Xinjiang Agricultural University, China. Her current research interests include optimal control and interorganizational management.
